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USING BEARD TO OVERCOME
BEARDIANISM: CHARLES BEARD’S
FORGOTTEN HISTORICISM AND THE
IDEAS-INTERESTS DICHOTOMY
Jonathan Gienapp*
Charles Beard’s An Economic Interpretation of the
Constitution of the United States is no different than many
scholarly classics—controversial, jarring, accessible, victim to the
abuses and appropriations of speed-readers, and claimed as the
original influence for several different (and sometimes
competing) scholarly movements. As with all classics, too, Beard’s
book makes for fresh reading. No matter how defensive Beard’s
remark was that “[p]erhaps no other book on the Constitution has
1
been more severely criticized, and so little read,” when one
brushes aside the intervening appropriations and interpretations
that have succeeded it and reads it anew, the work has an enduring
ability to surprise. One feature that might surprise is the historicist
impulse, which, however buried beneath classic statements of
economic determinism, was there all along.
Historicists come in many shapes and sizes, but they tend to
believe that the substance of human thought and action (beliefs,
values, and motivations) are historically constituted and, thus, are
2
not universally fixed in all people in all times and places.
Historicists de-naturalize processes, revealing how certain
descriptions and practices that might appear essential or
inevitable were, in fact, contingent historical creations.
Historicism is a methodological or philosophical posture in this
regard more than a topic of study; plenty of non-historians are
historicists while plenty of historians study the past without

* Assistant Professor of History, University of Mississippi.
1. CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1935).
2. For a good discussion of historicism, see Richard Rorty, Holism and Historicism,
in PHILOSOPHY AS CULTURAL POLITICS: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 176, 176–83 (2007).
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commitment to historicist principles. 3 These latter historians tend
to assume that some set of universal imperatives (be they
motivations lurking deep in human nature or imperatives of an
unchanging external world) help explain past human conduct. As
such, Beard, a self-described economic determinist, would not
seem an obvious candidate for the historicist label. Accordingly,
his historicism has been easy to miss. Rather than dwell on the
historically and culturally contingent context in which America’s
constitutional framers operated, Beard centered on the economic
interests they brought to the project, interests that seemingly
transcended the particularities of the historical moment.
Subsequent historians of the American Revolution and
Constitution only underscored these aspects of Beard’s work.
Beard’s economic determinist approach, and what seemed to
accompany it, helped spawn, as is well-known, the “progressive”
school of the American Revolution, an approach that, similarly to
Beard, tended to interpret the Constitution as a conservative
bulwark against popular democracy orchestrated by the
4
propertied classes. Whatever important differences remained,
3. There are differences, at least in emphasis, between historicism as method and
historicism as philosophy. In the latter case, historicists would tend to agree with Rorty
that people are “never going to be able to see things under the aspect of eternity.” See
Rorty, supra note 2, at ix. Historicists who are merely trying to illuminate historical
processes would not immediately focus on such epistemological and metaphilosophical
concerns, instead emphasizing the historical contingency of the specific human practices
that they are trying to bring into focus. But these different kinds of historicism easily feed
into one another. Consequently, historians took inspiration from a great many historicist
thinkers who were not properly historians. For those working in the humanities and the
social sciences in the last half of the twentieth century, among the most influential
historicists, for better or for worse, were Thomas Kuhn, Michel Foucault, and Clifford
Geertz. Each de-naturalized crucial aspects of modern life and, in the process, furnished a
generation of inquirers with tools, often useful but sometimes cumbersome, for
historicizing. Each was widely productive, but the following proved particularly influential:
MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS: AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF THE HUMAN
SCIENCES (1970); CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES (1973);
THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962). For more on
these broader developments, see DANIEL T. RODGERS, AGE OF FRACTURE (2011). For
more on how these developments specifically have impacted the field of historical study,
see WILLIAM H. SEWELL, JR., LOGICS OF HISTORY: SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL
TRANSFORMATION (2005); Gabrielle M. Spiegel, Introduction, in PRACTICING HISTORY:
NEW DIRECTIONS IN HISTORICAL WRITING AFTER THE LINGUISTIC TURN 1, 1–33
(Gabrielle M. Spiegel ed., 2005).
4. Collapsing any collection of historians into a single group must always be done
with considerable caution. But, as the story is familiarly told, the “progressive” historians
of the American Revolution emphasized the internal conflicts that the Revolution spurred
more than the broader struggle between the colonies and Great Britain against which these
internal conflicts were set. Accordingly, the struggle to ratify the proposed federal
Constitution was less a political escape from colonization than it was a crucial chapter in
the deeper struggle between different groups of Americans for control of or inclusion
within the emerging polity. Important select works, beyond Beard’s, helped form this
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those who contributed to this interpretive orientation were either
increasingly linked with Marxist approaches to human inquiry or
themselves consciously endorsed that linkage. Consequently,
Beard’s account of the Constitution has often been explained by
reference to materialist social theories of the nineteenth century.
As Peter Novick wrote in his widely read work on objectivity and
the development of the American historical profession in the
twentieth century, Beard’s “crude reduction of Marxism to
economic determinism,” directly “informed . . . An Economic
5
Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States.” These
intellectual commitments seemed to explain what had led Beard
to see political ideologies as superstructural rhetoric obscuring the
play of real economic self-interest lurking beneath (a classic
Marxist formulation). “The theories of government which men
entertain are emotional reactions to their property interests” is
6
how he himself put the matter.
When historians some half-century or so after Beard came to
acquire a new appreciation for ideology and its importance,
Beard’s account of constitutional creation played the convenient
foil to this emerging focus. Scholars like Bernard Bailyn, Gordon
Wood, Edmund Morgan, Jack Greene, John Phillip Reid, and so
many others took as their starting point the profound differences
separating the mental world of the eighteenth century from that
of today and thus took their task to be systematic acts of
conceptual translation through which alone the Revolution and
its enduring political and legal embodiment (the Constitution)
7
might be understood. And they either consciously or implicitly
school of interpretation: CARL LOTUS BECKER, THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN
THE PROVINCE OF NEW YORK, 1760-1776 (1909); MERRILL JENSEN, THE ARTICLES OF
CONFEDERATION: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE SOCIAL-CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1774-1781 (1959); CURTIS P. NETTELS, THE ROOTS OF
AMERICAN CIVILIZATION: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN COLONIAL LIFE (1938); 3 VERNON
L. PARRINGTON, MAIN CURRENTS IN AMERICAN THOUGHT (1954). For Beard’s own
belief that the Constitution’s advocates were seeking to secure the property classes from
democratic intrusions, consider, “it is to the owners of personalty anxious to find a foil
against the attacks of leveling democracy, that the authors of The Federalist address their
most cogent arguments . . . .” See BEARD, supra note 1, at 154.
5. PETER NOVICK, THAT NOBLE DREAM: THE “OBJECTIVITY QUESTION” AND
THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL PROFESSION 96 (1988).
6. See BEARD, supra note 1, at 157. “The social structure by which one type of
legislation is secured and another prevented—that is, the constitution—is a secondary or
derivative feature arising from the nature of the economic groups seeking positive action
and negative restraint.” Id. at 13.
7. See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION (1967); JACK P. GREENE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION (2011); EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE
RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA (1988); JOHN PHILLIP
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built their accounts in contradistinction to what Beard seemed to
have advanced. This tendency was only compounded as neoprogressive historians, who arose in response to this ideological
reorientation of the founding era, began reviving some Beardian
8
themes.
Emphasizing economic interest is not irreconcilable with
historicism. But Beard was an avowed universalist who believed
that timeless material interest explained human behavior no
matter differences across space or through time. As he himself
wrote, “it has seemed to me, and does now, that in the great
transformations in society . . . economic ‘forces’ are primordial or
fundamental, and come nearer ‘explaining’ events than any other
9
‘forces.’” Consequently, suggesting that Beard was a historicist
might seem far-fetched. It is not just because the observation
might seem strikingly perverse that I raise it. It is also not to
rescue Beard from reductionist labels, even if his work contained
important elements not easily reconciled with the common
10
determinist portrait. It is because grasping the historicist
dimension in Beard, however small and buried, is helpful in
overcoming the ahistoricist impulses that, thanks in part to Beard,
remain deeply pervasive in historical study in particular and the
human sciences more generally. The common thread that has tied
REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: ABRIDGED
EDITION (1995); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 17761787 (1969). These books represent only some of the most sophisticated spokesmen and
only some of the best examples of each of their many contributions.
8. See WOODY HOLTON, FORCED FOUNDERS: INDIANS, DEBTORS, SLAVES, AND
THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN VIRGINIA (1999); STAUGHTON LYND,
INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN RADICALISM (1968); GARY B. NASH, THE
URBAN CRUCIBLE: THE NORTHERN SEAPORTS AND THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION (1979); ALFRED F. YOUNG, LIBERTY TREE: ORDINARY PEOPLE AND THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION (2006); Jesse Lemish, Jack Tar in the Streets: Merchant Seamen
in the Politics of the American Revolution, 25 WM. & MARY Q. 371, 371–407(1968).
9. See BEARD, supra note 1, at xii.
10. To be very clear, Beard’s historicism accounted for only part of his exploration.
Much of the reason he proved such a convenient target for the ideological school was
because he deserved to be. He engaged in his share of anachronisms, all too often allowing
his presentist categories to overwhelm his evidence. The areas where Beard’s
anachronisms run amok could be documented at length, such as his need to flatten most
of the delegates’ thoughtful constitutional reflections into a crude dichotomy between
proponents and opponents of generic democratic leveling; his insistent refusal to see
representation as credibly derived from anything but voting (something nobody other than
James Wilson and a few other rogues thought in eighteenth-century America); and his
inability to move beyond The Federalist (especially his obsession with Federalist 10) to
any of the other contemporary statements made in favor of the proposed Constitution that
were in many ways more representative of the period’s prevailing assumptions. For
Beard’s faulty assessment of surviving sources, in particular, see BEARD, supra note 1, at
152–53.
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together most accounts of the American Revolution and the
Constitution’s creation has been Beardianism.
Beard’s account of constitutional creation has been largely
discredited. Yet he remains as vital as ever; whether the implied
target of new arguments or inspiration for a new “progressive”
account of the Revolution (purified of his missteps and excesses
11
of course), Beard continues to frame much of the conversation.
No matter how many years pass or how much new research
surfaces, he does not seem to recede permanently into the
unknown. The primary reason Beard remains so relevant is
because of the pernicious, yet amazingly compelling, distinction
between ideas and interests that he did so much to perpetuate.
Beard’s specific argument has been dismantled, but the Beardian
conceptual architecture remains firmly in place, taken for granted
at so many turns that its persistent influence remains hard to
detect. In other words, one can repudiate Beard (his conclusions)
while perpetuating Beardianism (his guiding premises). As long
as we continue to think of ideology and interests as categorically
distinct and antagonistic, we will all remain Beardians in an
important sense.
The lingering and unfortunate appeal of this framing
dichotomy is owed in part to the ambiguity that continues to
surround ideology and its cognates. Ideology has meant both a set
of principles, ideals, or values to which individuals willingly
subscribe; or, it has also meant a structured consciousness, a
phenomenological perspective that rests at the very bottom of
human perception. In the latter instance, the matter would better
be described as a culture, a conceptual framework, or a mode of
12
This rival version involves little willing
consciousness.
11. See TERRY BOUTON, TAMING DEMOCRACY: “THE PEOPLE,” THE FOUNDERS,
AND THE TROUBLED ENDING OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (2007); WOODY
HOLTON, UNRULY AMERICANS AND THE ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION (2007). Both

authors have built accounts of 1780s American constitutional development around a
Beardian framework.
12. Versions of this conception are often owed to the work of Clifford Geertz. See
GEERTZ, supra note 3. Among the works of history that have skillfully invoked this sort of
model, see KEITH MICHAEL BAKER, INVENTING THE FRENCH REVOLUTION: ESSAYS ON
FRENCH POLITICAL CULTURE IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY (1990); J. G. A. POCOCK,
THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE
ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION (1975) [hereinafter MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT]; 2
QUENTIN SKINNER, THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN POLITICAL THOUGHT (1978).
Skinner’s and Pocock’s several sophisticated methodological contributions all have
contemplated ideology in this fashion. See, for instance, Quentin Skinner, Meaning and
Understanding in the History of Ideas, 8 HIST. & THEORY 3 (1969); Quentin Skinner, On
Performing and Explaining Linguistic Actions, 21 PHIL. Q. 1 (1971); Quentin Skinner,
Some Problems in the Analysis of Political Thought and Action, 2 POL. THEORY 277 (1974);
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subscription, it is not a set of principles or commitments that one
chooses. It is a way of organizing one’s surroundings and giving
them sense, a perceptual mode that precedes the formation of
either principles or interests. Just as there could be no beliefs or
desires without such a mode (without understanding of how to use
available semantic vocabularies to give meaning to the world),
there could be no principles or interests. Since there are no preperceptual interests, there is certainly no formation or recognition
of economic self-interest independent of the semantic conceptual
13
framework that makes it possible.
Beard, of course, did not grasp this point and incorrectly
assumed that economic interests were innate, universal, and
independent of cultural perception. But Beardianism, in its most
generic form, remains vital because his failure to grasp the
14
historicist and cultural origins of interests still resonates. As long
as we continue to think that ideas, ideologies, or values stand in
opposition to interests or the prospect of material gain we will still
reside in Beard’s world, because those who take ideas seriously
will spend much of their time attempting to prove (likely
unsuccessfully) that historical speakers were sincere while those
who take interests seriously will paint ideas as little more than
rhetorical covers, easy enough to brush aside in order to
determine what was really going on. The day that we fully realize
that neither principles nor interests exist independently of the
perceptual mode that accounts for them, and that it becomes the
job of all historians (whether intellectual, social, economic,
Quentin Skinner, Hermeneutics and the Role of History, 7 NEW LITERARY HIST. 209
(1975). For Pocock, see J. G. A. POCOCK, POLITICS, LANGUAGE, AND TIME: ESSAYS ON
POLITICAL THOUGHT AND HISTORY (1971); J. G. A. POCOCK, VIRTUE, COMMERCE, AND
HISTORY: ESSAYS ON POLITICAL THOUGHT AND HISTORY CHIEFLY IN THE EIGHTEENTH
CENTURY (1985); J. G. A. POCOCK, POLITICAL THOUGHT AND HISTORY: ESSAYS ON
THEORY AND METHOD (2009).
13. Philosophers of mind and language have authored the most penetrating work on
this subject. As philosopher Robert Brandom has so trenchantly put it, “Though linguistic
practice does, to be sure, help us in pursuing our ends, the vast majority of those ends are
ones we could not so much as entertain, never mind secure, apart from our participation in
linguistic practice. Most of the things we want to do we can only even want to do because
we can talk. The very intelligibility of the ends depends on our linguistic capacities. They
are precisely not goals we can make sense of first, so that later language can be brought
into the picture playing the role of a possible tool for achieving them.” ROBERT B.
BRANDOM, PERSPECTIVES ON PRAGMATISM: CLASSICAL, RECENT, CONTEMPORARY 80
(2011). Richard Rorty has similarly added that a revolutionary “new vocabulary makes
possible, for the first time, a formulation of its own purpose.” RICHARD RORTY,
CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY 13 (1989).
14. David Armitage, What’s the Big Idea? Intellectual History and the Longue Durée,
38 HISTORY OF EUROPEAN IDEAS 493, comments briefly, but powerfully, on how this
economistic reasoning continues to affect the history of ideas in far-reaching ways.
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political, or cultural) to reconstitute the different perceptual
framework of the historical actors in question, is the day we early
Americanists and students of constitutional history will leave
Beardianism behind.
More than most fields of study, the study of the American
Revolution remains ensnared in this false ideas-interests
15
dichotomy, one that should be abandoned once and for all. The
most well-known intellectual historian of the Revolution, Gordon
Wood, has recently suggested that ideas, if not the cause of
behavior, forever accompany it, meaning that the conventional
ideas-interests divide requires amendment. While correct and
useful, Wood’s suggestion does not go far enough and revitalizes,
as much as it dismantles, the distinction that he targets. As he has
written, “What is permissible culturally affects what is permissible
socially or politically, so that although ideas may not be the
motives for behavior (underlying interests and passions are the
16
real motives), ideas do affect and limit behavior.” Indeed, plans
of action cannot be legitimate unless defended with culturally
legitimate reasons. Even if we assumed that the American framers
were thoroughly self-interested, it would still be our primary task
to reconstitute the conceptual vocabularies that animated them,
since those would be necessary to grasp how they gave the world
meaning, an understanding from which alone we could make
sense of their behavior, behavior which notably involved
constructing the United States’ Federal Constitution. But the socalled “passions” and “interests,” every bit as much as the ideas
that accompanied them, are the product of meaning and culture.
They cannot exist prior to perception, they cannot make any sense
or motivate anything detached from the ordering framework of a
conceptual vocabulary, so they certainly should not be seen as
something distinct in character from ideas. They are distinct by
15. Jack Rakove acknowledges and briefly describes the pervasiveness of this
dichotomy in Revolutionary American scholarship; see Jack Rakove, Can We Know a
Foundational Idea When We See One?, in NATURE AND HISTORY IN AMERICAN
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT: A DEBATE 91, 91–112 (2006). As just one revealing example,
see the WM. & MARY Q. symposium issue that focused on Gordon Wood’s seminal
CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, which, despite intense disagreement among
commentators, was shaped by a pervasive commitment to the ideology-interest divide. See
Forum: The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787: A Symposium of Views and
Reviews, 44 WM. & MARY Q. 3, 549–640 (1987). Also consider the conceptual framing at
work in one of Wood’s earlier and more famous essays, Gordon S. Wood, Rhetoric and
Reality in the American Revolution, 23 WM. & MARY Q. 3 (1966).
16. GORDON S. WOOD, THE IDEA OF AMERICA: REFLECTIONS ON THE BIRTH OF
THE UNITED STATES 17 (2011). This formulation largely derives from the seminal Quentin
Skinner piece, “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas.”
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degree, but certainly not by kind. So, contrary to Wood’s
unfortunate concession, it does not make sense to say that
interests motivate behavior while ideas do not since interests are
a form of ideas, a product of the same semantic languages that
human beings use to cope with their world successfully. Thus,
explaining the framers’ behavior (be it principled or interested)
will prove impossible without a sophisticated grasp of the
historically constituted conceptual materials that shaped their
fundamental consciousness.
Accordingly, given his firm belief that all thought was
reducible to interest, Beard tells us little about American
constitutional creation. But, if only inadvertently, he does tell us
something important about Revolutionary conceptual materials.
Not surprisingly, he failed to draw out the full implications of his
observations; but the historicist impulse lurking within warrants
exploration. Because even if Beard’s work and approach was
deeply ahistoricist and even if his approach has helped burden us
with an ahistorical notion of self-interest, important observations
that he offered can, if properly explored, compel us to grasp some
of those distinctly different Revolutionary mental materials and
patterns of thought through which alone the Constitution’s origins
might be understood. In others words, carrying through on an
important aspect of Beard might enable us to overcome
Beardianism once and for all.
In intriguing ways, Beard took the eighteenth century
seriously on its own terms. He, for instance, thought that he was
applying eighteenth-century political science to the construction
of the Constitution. “In fact,” as he wrote in his opening pages,
“the inquiry which follows is based upon the political science of
James Madison, the father of the Constitution and later President
17
of the Union he had done so much to create.” This observation
marks no revelation; but it is worth considering some of the
substantive ways in which Beard actually followed through on this
assertion and what it helps us see about the eighteenth century
itself.
Much eighteenth-century political science, and especially
Madison’s, limited the importance of human personality and
charisma in understanding political phenomena. This insight
proved attractive to Americans in part because, as they had long
realized, republics were fragile entities easily corrupted by

17.

See BEARD, supra note 1, at 14.
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unvirtuous leaders. 18 A well-structured polity, a republic that
could endure, was then precisely one that was so perfectly
organized, that successfully united underlying political forces in
such perfect harmony, that it generated a system that could run
successfully in most hands. Eighteenth-century theorists
expressed varying degrees of optimism regarding this idea’s
explanatory power. Some still insisted that personal virtue
remained an indispensable dimension of republican politics, no
matter how well-structured a regime might be. But, nonetheless,
many American constitutional thinkers felt confident that the
American experiment in government would prove successful
because they had come to adequately understand and apply the
emerging principles of political science, ones that privileged deep
19
structure in questions of political architecture. They had learned,
most notably from the widely read French political theorist
Montesquieu and the thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment, that
understanding human nature and politics involved grasping the
deep underlying springs that organized both people and regimes,
forces which, if properly activated and orchestrated, could do
more than the character of any subsequent individual leader to
ensure sound, long-term governance. American constitutional
thinkers believed that political science had taught them that those
who made political decisions were often less decisive in the
ultimate scope of history than the underlying political structures
that were in place when those decisions were made. Their science,
in other words, was increasingly a structural and mechanistic one.
Thus, eighteenth-century sources had taught Beard, and
correctly, that many early American political thinkers were
interested in how underlying structural principles took priority
over individual political agency. Beard, in a meaningful sense
then, applied this principle against the men who arrived at it,
suggesting that the underlying structural principles in place at the
time of the Constitution’s construction had more to do with its
eventual makeup than did the idiosyncratic choices of the
delegates who populated the convention. Scientifically
understanding political outcomes was a matter of grasping the
mechanistic springs that undergirded the actors’ specific political

18. For more on the fragility of republics in early modern political thinking, see
MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT, supra note 12.
19. Gordon S. Wood, America’s Enlightenment, in AMERICA AND ENLIGHTENMENT
CONSTITUTIONALISM 159, 159–175 (Gary L. McDowell & Johnathan O’ Neill eds., 2006)
(discussing the optimism shared among Revolutionary American political thinkers).

5 - USING BEARD TO OVERCOME BEARDIANISM (DO NOT DELETE)

376

7/21/2014 9:16 AM

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 29:367

existence. As Beard himself wrote in the preface to the 1935
edition of An Economic Interpretation,
In that study I had occasion to read voluminous writings by the
Fathers, and I was struck by the emphasis which so many of
them placed upon economic interests as forces in politics and
in the formulation of laws and constitutions. In particular I was
impressed by the philosophy of politics set forth by James
Madison in Number X of the Federalist . . . which seemed to
furnish a clue to practical operations connected with the
formation of the Constitution—operations in which Madison
20
himself took a leading part.

Beard followed this statement by disputing that he was shaped by
Marx, an apology that was perhaps overblown. But it is important
to recognize what he was saying—that before thinkers in the
nineteenth century began obsessing over social structures and
their relationship to politics, eighteenth-century thinkers
(especially the architects of the United States Constitution), in a
manner quite different than their successors, were themselves
deeply invested in deciphering a structural relationship between
society and politics.
Beard’s interest in eighteenth-century political science did
not stop there. When he justified his reliance on Madison, he, as
many subsequent historians and political scientists have,
extensively quoted Federalist 10. Among the important points
that he identified in this famous essay was the relationship
between factions and property-holding, a connection captured
best in a Madisonian statement on which Beard heavily relied:
“The most common and durable source of factions has been the
various and unequal distribution of property. Those who hold and
those who are without property have ever formed distinct
21
interests in society.” Beard referred to these statements,
somewhat awkwardly, as a “masterly statement of economic
22
determinism in politics.” It was doubtfully that, but Beard’s
appreciation of this Madisonian statement and the conventional
wisdom on which it was built was sound and important.
Madison was saying little that was new for his time. In fact he
was reiterating something that republican political theorists had
been insisting upon for centuries—namely, that the balance of
20.
21.

See BEARD, supra note 1, at vi.
James Madison, THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, in 14 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 181(Merrill Jensen et al. eds., 1976).
22. See BEARD, supra note 1, at vii.
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property determined the balance of power. From Machiavelli and
Thomas More, to James Harrington and Montesquieu, to the
disaffected English “country” Whigs like John Trenchard and
Thomas Gordon, virtually all political writers of this era took it as
commonplace that the distribution of property largely determined
what kind of regime might endure in a given society. Effectively
their point was always the same, only in a society where there was
a relatively equal distribution of property could republican
23
political institutions flourish. It was not a normative statement
about what sort of a regime was preferable, but entirely a
descriptive one about what sorts of necessary conditions made
certain regimes possible.
Hence these republican forebears spent considerable time
studying the ancient Roman agrarian laws, while Revolutionary
Americans who were themselves persuaded by this thinking
obsessed over repealing English land-inheritance practices bent
on consolidating wealth (such as primogeniture and entail) in
their new state legal codes, and Federalists during the ratification
struggle reiterated time and again that the greatest protection
against the kind of aristocratic centralization that Anti-federalists
thought the Constitution all but assured was the relatively
24
equitable distribution of wealth that already existed in America.
The United States, Federalists maintained, would remain
republican in spite of constitutional innovation because it enjoyed
the requisite social makeup. Fisher Ames, the Massachusetts
Federalist, hinted at so much when he said that the Revolution
had provided the chance “to reduce to practice the schemes,
which Plato and Harrington had only sketched upon paper,”
schemes which would enable the American republic to be
25
“perfect and perpetual.” And Jonathan Jackson, another
Federalist from Massachusetts, made the point even more
explicitly:

23. See ERIC NELSON, THE GREEK TRADITION IN REPUBLICAN THOUGHT (2004).
24. For more on the abolition of primogeniture and entail in the new American states
and its ideological significance, see 2 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 305–24 (Julian
P. Boyd, et al. eds., 1950). For a good example of American political writing that betrays
this early modern republican preoccupation, connects Roman agrarian laws to the
American abolition of primogeniture and entail, and draws upon these arguments to
defend the proposed American Federal Constitution, see NOAH WEBSTER, AN
EXAMINATION INTO THE LEADING PRINCIPLES OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (1787).
For more on all of these topics, see NELSON, supra note 23, at 195–233.
25. FISHER AMES, Camillus IV, THE INDEPENDENT CHRONICLE, Mar. 8, 1787,
reprinted in WORKS OF FISHER AMES VOL. II, 82 (W. B. Allen ed., 1983).

5 - USING BEARD TO OVERCOME BEARDIANISM (DO NOT DELETE)

378

7/21/2014 9:16 AM

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 29:367
When we consider the small inequality of fortune throughout
this country, compared with others which we know . . . [t]hat in
most of the states the laws of primogeniture are gone or going,
out of use—that landed property is in general held in small
portions, even in the southern states, compared with the
manors, parks and royal demesnes of most countries – that
without the establishment of entails, it is almost impossible for
estates to grow to an alarming size, or even to continue long in
the same families . . . the period must be far distant, very far
distant, when there can be such a monopoly of landed estates,
as to throw the suffrages or even influence of electors into few
hands . . . . [W]here is the risk of an aristocracy dangerous to
26
liberty?

John Adams summed up the logic concisely, “In America, the
right of sovereignty resides indisputably in the body of the people,
27
and they have the whole property of the land.” Political
structure, in other words, derived from social constitution. The
kind of laws and government that were conducive to a given
people were firmly a product of their society’s character. When
Beard remarked that the framers “undoubtedly understood and
approved the doctrine of balanced classes in the government as
expounded in Adams’ Defence of American Constitutions, he was
28
gesturing towards this crucial eighteenth-century preoccupation.
But Madison was not entirely derivative; had he merely been
a good Machiavellian or Harringtonian in his sociological
thinking, he would have had a great deal to say about landed
property and much less to say about personal property (or
“realty” as opposed to “personalty” to invoke Beard’s famous
lexicon). But the financial and commercial revolutions of the
eighteenth century had required republican thinkers to ponder
29
new categories of analysis. The feudal outlook of Harrington and
26. JONATHAN JACKSON, THOUGHTS UPON THE POLITICAL SITUATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 56, 56, 57 (1788).
27. JOHN ADAMS, A DEFENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 309 (1787).
28. See BEARD, supra note 1, at 194. In general, when Beard explored what he called
the “political doctrines” of the framers he was not just flattening their thought and
imposing modern ideas of social structure and economic interest on it. He was also
grasping, as this quote reveals, some of the ways in which eighteenth-century actors
contemplated their own understanding of society and structure. Id. at 189–216.
29. See JOHN BREWER, THE SINEWS OF POWER: WAR, MONEY, AND THE ENGLISH
STATE, 1688-1783 (1989); P. G. M. DICKSON, THE FINANCIAL REVOLUTION IN ENGLAND:
A STUDY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC CREDIT 1688-1756 (1967); CARL
WENNERLIND, CASUALTIES OF CREDIT: THE ENGLISH FINANCIAL REVOLUTION, 16201720 (2011). For the American example, see E. JAMES FERGUSON, THE POWER OF THE
PURSE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN PUBLIC FINANCE, 1776-1790 (1961). For the dynamic
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the English commonwealth tradition left one’s structural analysis
at a dead end by the eighteenth century. Civil society was far more
diverse and multifaceted than such a model suggested, and
Madison, like most American constitutional thinkers, knew that
this complex array of economic and social interests interacted
with politics in crucial ways. Here Madison combined the
republican interest in determinate social constitution with the
newer idea (worked out primarily by Scottish Enlightenment
thinkers such as Adam Smith and Adam Ferguson) that politics
was derivative of a complex civil society comprised of interlocking
30
economic interdependencies. Thus, in Federalist 10 Madison did
not stop at landed wealth but indeed meditated upon the
numerous kinds of economic and social personality that politics
ultimately reflected. And it was this newer, eighteenth-century
appreciation of determinate social constitution that struck Beard
as so important. When he attempted to map, in extensive detail,
the multifaceted kinds of economic interests existent and
operative in Revolutionary America, Beard was helping show
how a varied civil society had provided a far more complicated
social portrait than had previously constituted American life, one
that, given the dictates of eighteenth-century political scientific
31
thinking, posed important challenges.
Madison was not an “economic determinist” in any modern
sense, despite Beard’s insistence; but that is precisely the point. It
is difficult today to talk about relationships between social
structure and politics without inadvertently encumbering the
discussion with the teachings (however diluted) of nineteenthcentury social theory generally and Marx specifically. But Beard,
ways in which these economic revolutions altered political thought and argument in the
eighteenth century, see MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT, supra note 12.
30. For the Scottish Enlightenment’s conception of “civil society,” see J. G. A.
Pocock, Cambridge Paradigms and Scotch Philosophers: A Study of the Relations Between
the Civic Humanist and the Civil Jurisprudential Interpretation of Eighteenth-Century
Social Thought, in WEALTH AND VIRTUE: THE SHAPING OF POLITICAL ECONOMY IN THE
SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT 235, 235–52 (Istvan Hont & Michael Ignatieff eds., 1984);
DOROTHY ROSS, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE (1991); Fania OzSalzberger, Civil Society in the Scottish Enlightenment, in CIVIL SOCIETY: HISTORY AND
POSSIBILITIES 58, 58–83 (Sudipta Kaviraj & Sunil Khilnani eds., 2001). For the connections
between Scottish and French economic thought, particularly as it related to new
understandings of extra-governmental spaces of human interaction, see DANIEL GORDON,
CITIZENS WITHOUT SOVEREIGNTY: EQUALITY AND SOCIABILITY IN FRENCH THOUGHT,
1670-1789 (1994); EMMA ROTHSCHILD, ECONOMIC SENTIMENTS: ADAM SMITH,
CONDORCET, AND THE ENLIGHTENMENT (2001). For more on “civil society” generally,
see Keith Michael Baker, Enlightenment and the Institution of Society: Notes for a
Conceptual History, in MAIN TRENDS IN CULTURAL HISTORY 95, 95–120 (Willem
Melching & Wyger Velema eds., 1994).
31. See BEARD, supra note 1, at 26–51 (discussing this particular portrayal).
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only inadvertently, helps us see that the eighteenth century had
its own understanding of social constitution and its relationship to
politics, one that proved indispensable to the Revolutionaries’
political and constitutional thought. In this regard, even if Beard
could not see his historicism all the way through, we can. And in
so doing, we can recapture something pivotal.
But taking Beard’s historicism seriously also sheds light on
Beard himself. For some time, Beard has largely been known for
two things—for offering the definitive economic or self-interested
take on the construction of the American Constitution and for
authoring one of the most controversial and enduring presidential
addresses ever delivered before the American Historical
Association, in which he openly wondered if historical inquiry
32
rested or ever could rest on secure epistemological foundations.
It has appeared strange to many that the avowed economic
determinist, who seemed to be warring against the winds of
postmodernism before they even swept through the academy,
could later play the epistemological skeptic with not only such
33
ease but with such zealous conviction.
But, if what has been argued here is any indication, it
becomes much easier to comprehend how Beard traveled from
one project to the next, a transition that has often been regarded
as a complete reversal of convictions. For if Beard’s great insight,
as he himself saw it, was that Madison’s own political science
better explained the character of the Constitution than anything
else Madison or any of the other delegates declared or sought—
if, in other words, he had turned the eighteenth century against
itself—then how could he himself in the early twentieth century
not wonder if the same could be done to him and, in turn, all
historians? Now, surely, much of Beard’s presentism (and
subsequent reflections upon that) was linked to his own political
activism and the urgent, polemical tendencies that grew out of it.
But, nonetheless, his interest in the modern historian’s difficulties
that emerged in trying to adequately represent the past also owed
something to his scholarly reflections. It was in part because
Beard had not dismissed the eighteenth century’s particularity,
but instead that he had, to his mind, embraced it on its own terms,
32. Charles A. Beard, Written History as an Act of Faith, in 39 AMERICAN
HISTORICAL REVIEW 219, 219–31 (1934).
33. See NOVICK, supra note 5, at 256–57. Those who have detected an affinity
between the two intellectual contributions have emphasized that the presentist, political
agenda governing the historical work fed the relativist epistemological reflections. This
connection is distinct from the one I want to suggest.
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that he had begun wondering aloud if any historian’s work, much
like any constitution-writer’s work, could escape its particular
historical conditioning. Beard’s historicism failed in many ways,
but he did not think so and that helps us understand both his later
development and how Beard himself might be deployed against
Beardianism.
Much as Beard tried to turn the founders back against
themselves, I have turned Beard back against himself in the hopes
of moving past Beardianism. Beard’s classic book should not be
forgotten—it still represents an important historiographical
touchstone, one to which all students of the Revolutionary era
ought to be exposed; nor should Beard be forgotten—students of
Progressive-era America and especially its intellectual currents
must continue (as they already ably have) to explore Beard and
34
the intellectual and institutional world that shaped him. What
should be forgotten and brushed aside is Beardianism—or the
need to conflate the obvious point that some people in all societies
(especially political leaders) will be self-interested and that
economic and regional interests have played and will continue to
play a role in politics with the much different point that interests
are pre-perceptual, and thus prior to and independent of the use
of a historically contingent conceptual vocabulary. A fully
historicist understanding of ideas and interests forces us to
retrieve and reconstitute the perceptual framework that animated
even the most unscrupulous and self-interested of politicians,
because not everybody needs principles but all humans, to
meaningfully act, must be equipped with the materials by which
they can give their world meaning. Beardianism, and its legacy,
still prevents us from seeing things in that fully historicist fashion.
Might we then turn Beard back against himself to simultaneously
appreciate Beard while demolishing Beardianism in the process?

34. Many have begun exploring the importance of Beard’s thought within the context
of Progressive-era America. See CUSHING STROUT, THE PRAGMATIC REVOLT IN
AMERICAN HISTORY: CARL BECKER AND CHARLES BEARD (1958); RICHARD
HOFSTADTER, THE PROGRESSIVE HISTORIANS: TURNER, BEARD, PARRINGTON (1968);
ELLEN NORE, CHARLES A. BEARD: AN INTELLECTUAL BIOGRAPHY (1983); LEON FINK,
PROGRESSIVE INTELLECTUALS AND THE DILEMMAS OF DEMOCRATIC COMMITMENT
(1997); CLYDE W. BARROW, MORE THAN A HISTORIAN: THE POLITICAL AND
ECONOMIC THOUGHT OF CHARLES A. BEARD (2000); KAREN ORREN AND STEPHEN
SKOWRONEK, THE SEARCH FOR AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT (2004); JOHN
LOUIS RECCHIUTI, CIVIC ENGAGEMENT: SOCIAL SCIENCE AND PROGRESSIVE-ERA
REFORM IN NEW YORK CITY (2006).

